"Ostpolitik as a source of intra-bloc tensions"
by Dr. Oliver Bange, Mannheim University (Project "Ostpolitik and Détente")

[Ostpolitik caused friction on a number of different levels – it sparked tensions within Willy Brandt's party, the SPD, parliament, the coalition cabinet, tensions with the Western allies, and even within the Eastern bloc. It is the latter two that this paper is devoted, arranging documents from various national archives around nine distinct but interconnected arguments. Inevitably, such a vue d'ensemble has to start with an explanation of the goals and tactics underlying the new Eastern policy as devised during Brandt’s time as foreign minister of the “Grand Coalition” from December 1966 to September 1969, and put into practice during his chancellorship of the social-liberal coalition until 1974 and then onwards to the CSCE in Helsinki on August 1, 1975.]

One might compare the "Neue Ostpolitik" of Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr with a coin: the currency, or ultimate goal, imprinted on it is called "unification" – in order to avoid any compromise to the original borders of the vanished Reich, Brandt refused to speak about "re-unification", preferring the "unification" or "Zusammenwachsen" (growing closer) of the two existing German states. The two sides of the coin represent two long-term strategies to achieve unification. Undermining Communism by exposing the people under its rule to Western values and liberties was one side of the coin. However, the eventual breakdown of Communism itself would not guarantee German unification. The other side of the coin was therefore to devise an all-European security system, taking care of the legitimate security concerns of all nations (including the United States and the Soviet Union) concerned by a prospective unification of the two German states. This, and only this it was argued at the time, could possibly ease the way to unification after an eventual collapse of the regimes in Eastern Europe. Of course, with a secret agenda like this, Brandt and Bahr had to play their cards very close to their chests. For this reason, some of the best evidence for this double-sided strategy is found not in the German archives (for obvious domestic and party political reasons) but in the archives of other Western allies, particularly in Washington and Paris, where this strategy had to be "sold" and defended, and those in Eastern Europe, where the success of the strategy – once it was recognised – became a reason for great concern. The following represents an overview and summary of the arguments deriving from the inter-archival, international research undertaken for our project on "Ostpolitik and Détente" at the University of Mannheim.1]
The "New Ostpolitik" was built upon American and French strategies that were instituted from 1960/61 onwards, and particularly on the concept of "ideological competition" first developed in the United States by Dean Rusk during the Kennedy years, then refined by the Johnson Administration from 1964.

As a strategic planning game, Ostpolitik was an intelligent, early reaction to the new approaches developed under de Gaulle and Kennedy. Seen from Berlin – but not only from Berlin – these approaches offered real alternatives to the prevention-of-reunification-concept of the then Adenauer government. Within this new strategy, two aspects can be clearly distinguished: one is the search for the holy grail (i.e. a unified Germany) in a new European security system (proposed by de Gaulle as early as 1959/60, and followed up by him with concrete policies from 1961/62); the other one is the idea of an intensive ideological struggle through, above or under the Iron Curtain, conceived perhaps by Kennedy or, much more probably, by the team around his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, back in 1961.²

The catalyst for the development and continuing refinement of that strategy appears to have been the – at least in American eyes – catastrophic summit between Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna. The young president had hoped to meet a sovereign practitioner of power, with whom he could strike a deal on the status quo, at least in Europe if not on a global basis. Instead, he encountered a dogmatician, a Kremlin ruler precariously endangered at home, whose rhetoric was more than at a par with his own.³ In the following years, Dean Rusk kept on talking to Brandt about the West’s ideological superiority, arguing that it would be better to look forward to ideological "competition" than to shy away from it.⁴ The most appropriate weapons for that struggle would be human contacts of all sorts, culture and, above all, the exchange of information.

It was only under Johnson that the loose and largely unconnected ideas of Kennedy's men were finally cast into a coherent strategy. Already in January 1964 this strategy became the – at least internally – declared foundation of American policy towards the Eastern bloc. The euphemism used by the Johnson White House to present this strategy to the outside world – "bridge building" – meanwhile served as a cover for its true agenda, a function which Egon Bahr's celebrated contemporary catch-phrase of "change by rapprochement (Wandel durch Annäherung)" provided for the Neue Ostpolitik. Contrary to the established "truth" accepted over the past forty-odd years of a Vietnam-crazy Lyndon B. Johnson and a bureaucratic and unimaginable Dean Rusk, the personal impact of these two personalities on the development and course of this strategy can hardly be overestimated. Despite some rather curious
anecdotes, like Johnson's personal zest to force Brezhnev into accepting a guest appearance of the “Hello Dolly” musical in Moscow, we seem to witness – led by Thomas Schwartz's book – the beginning of a fundamental revision of Johnson's foreign policy posture, to which more recent research on the inter-relationship between Brandt's Ostpolitik und Johnson's détente policy can now be added.

However, looking at the White House and State Department papers, one finds very little material on this "softening up from within" strategy below the level of the President or Secretary of State, not even for internal purposes. One reason for this might be that, during the Johnson years, "Deutschlandpolitik" was almost exclusively the prerogative of the Secretary of State's own office. Whether this concept was handed over to the following administration and, if so, to what extent it influenced the Eastern policies of Nixon and Kissinger is still an open question. Despite the wealth of transition papers in the Johnson Library which bear tribute to a rather unique and comprehensive transition process between the Johnson and Nixon Administrations (perhaps surprisingly so), the author was unable to locate any documents concerning East-West relations, nor any with a particular concern for "bridge building" ideas. Nevertheless, within the Nixon Papers in the National Archives in Washington, an important paper from Henry Kissinger has survived from mid-February 1969, comparing for the newly-inaugurated President the approaches taken to East-West relations and détente by his incoming administration with those taken by Johnson's team. Here, Kissinger – himself a former consultant to both Johnson and Rusk – described in detail for his new employer the goals and strategies developed by his predecessor, only to reject them in the end as a risky strategy of "compartmentalization of our relations with the USSR" and to argue – completely in tune with Nixon's own thinking – for a series of pragmatic and inter-linked status-quo agreements between the two superpowers.

Given that these concepts were developed under Kennedy and Johnson, there can be very little question that LBJ's speech of October 1966 was not the fundamental shift in policies on Germany that Ernest May has recently argued it to be. Johnson appears at best to have felt rather less obliged to follow the long-established bilateral terminology, perhaps encouraged by the latest developments in Bonn’s own German policy.

French fears of German (re-)unification were at the heart of de Gaulle’s all-European security concept and of Pompidou’s rejection of any subversive Ostpolitik tactics

In June 1965 a remarkable event took place in the Elysée Palace in Paris: Willy Brandt, then Governing Mayor of West Berlin, met almost totally in private with President Charles de
Gaulle. This was anything but a meeting between equals, more a ritualised occasion for the exchange of pleasantries and the renewal of French readiness to defend Western liberties in Berlin. However, this time, everything was different. Instead of listening politely to the opening address of his visitor, de Gaulle got straight to the heart of things: What kind of policy towards the East, what kind of "Ostpolitik", would he, the great Charles de Gaulle, pursue, if he was a German? There wasn't a single word, a single hint at the private and confidential discussions that he held on this issue in preceding years with Konrad Adenauer. Both of the two elder statesmen had conceded at the latest by 1962 – when Adenauer had still held the Chancellorship of the Federal Republic – that the Soviet Union had now to be counted amongst the "peace-loving nations" in Europe. This Konrad Adenauer only dared to say in public some five years later during a CDU party congress, duly retreating in the face of his enraged party followers. The reason for which de Gaulle and Adenauer had come to this conclusion was the resurgence of China as a major power in the Far East, within the Communist world and with the potential of becoming, rather sooner than later, the third global superpower. This – according to the rationale of Europe's two old men – would inevitably force the Soviet leadership to redirect its strategic and ideological focus to its Eastern borders while swapping towards a rather defensive "status quo" policy in Europe.11

What followed after de Gaulle's introductory question in his talk with Willy Brandt in 1965 can rightly be considered as a master plan for exactly the kind of Ostpolitik which Brandt would practice from 1969 onwards – at least as far as its strategic and security dimensions were concerned. One can only speculate about the reasons behind de Gaulle's extraordinary initiative – comparable conversations with Chancellor Erhard or Foreign Minister Schröder were not recorded.12 On a range of key questions, the identity of their thinking about security and defense policy questions was almost complete, from the opening up of West Germany's relations with the states in Eastern Europe in distinct phases to the idea of a possible change of the status quo through its acceptance with regard to the Oder-Neisse-line, the GDR as a second German state, and the renunciation of nuclear weapons. Losing no time on thoughts about strategies of undermining or subversion, de Gaulle simply registered the Kremlin's status quo policy in Europe and concluded from that the inevitable breakdown of the Warsaw bloc in the distant future:


Pompidou’s papers give very clear confirmation of Brandt’s and Bahr’s tactic of "Socialdemocratism", a concept which was distinct from the more familiar political
movement, Social Democracy, as we shall see. During the very first months of his presidency, Pompidou’s closest adviser, Raimond, wrote three lengthy memoranda on German Ostpolitik. The memoranda deemed reunification by ideologically undermining the regimes in the East and by military neutralisation – even unification itself – to be incompatible with French national interests, and therefore advanced appropriate counterstrategies.¹⁴ When compared with the de Gaulle era, Pompidou’s hasty reactions are a clear indication that the three most important determinants of France’s German and Eastern policy, even of its entire foreign policy, were undergoing a fundamental change. De Gaulle propagated a concept of German unification in a changed European framework. This meant – at least in the understanding of his contemporaries – that the actual event of unification was deferred to the indefinite future. This was, of course, a clever trick on the part of de Gaulle because it defused the potential rift over that question in Franco-German relations. Now, however, Pompidou, Jobert and Raimond conceded – after the experiences of the Prague Spring and what they perceived as an unduly strong involvement of West German social democrats in the Prague events – that the new and more independent German Ostpolitik made for a far greater probability of success regarding the unification of East and West Germany. This naturally represented a forthright danger to France’s role as a mediator between the governments in Bonn and in Eastern Europe (a role much cherished by de Gaulle himself). France also no longer appeared to be in a position to veto British entry into the EEC, at least in the medium term, and, in addition, the latest shifts in the balance-of-power in – or with respect to – East-West relations seemed to militate strongly against the prolongation of such a Gaullist stance. British entry, however, would weaken France’s key position within the EEC and, at the same time, Paris was losing its – sometimes illusionary – role as a mediator between East and West due to the new focus of the East European states on Bonn. However, practical consequences for French policy stemming from that analysis took some time to emerge, probably first showing in Pompidou’s deep mistrust of Brandt in 1973 and his initiative for basket III (free movement of persons and information, human rights) within the CSCE process.¹⁵

Therefore, both of the strategic concepts which constituted the basis of Brandt’s and Bahr’s new approach to Ostpolitik were of limited originality, while their combination and instrumentalisation for a specific German goal – unification – added a new and controversial dimension to the strategic outlook.
and the German need for a protective power, relating this to the specific conditions and objectives that applied in Berlin and Germany as a whole. Following from this observation, the original contribution of Brandt and Bahr would be twofold: on the one hand, it would be the realisation that Germany, and particularly the SPD, were able to play a special role in this Western strategy, and, on the other hand, it would consist in a very perceptive connection between the German dream of unification and this Western strategy, as opposed to silent acceptance of the elimination of this goal from the Western agenda.\(^{16}\) Bahr called this strategy "socialdemocratism" – a term that would either have to be put into question in the light of what has been said before about the original elements of the strategy, or would also have to contain a second delimitation towards the West. The fact that, for the FDP (the German Liberals), Schollwer also started working on plans to achieve unification within a European security system as early as 1962/63 is yet another proof for the need to track the origins of the international-system strategy within the new Ostpolitik to an earlier date; it is also a further indication of the external influences acting on its makers.\(^{17}\) After the Social-Liberal coalition was formed, Jürgen Diesel, one of Bahr’s closest collaborators in the Planungsstab, the think-tank of West Germany's Foreign Office, greeted Schollwer's ideas with utter astonishment, irked “that such a paper could possibly have been written up without any participation of the Planungsstab in the proceedings.”\(^{18}\)

Recent studies have tracked the origins in Brandt's thinking of a strategy of undermining Communism by a multiplication of information and communication to the late 1950s.\(^{19}\) Arne Hoffmann, in a doctoral thesis written at the London School of Economics, has recently pointed to the mutual impact of Brandt and Kennedy as almost a precondition for the development of this strategy. This must put into question the notion of Willy Brandt as a monolithic genius – in itself a questionable concept reflecting a late German romanticism that became very popular in Germany since Brandt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. From this perspective, the merits of the creators of Bonn's new Eastern and German policies would instead lie in the early recognition of momentous shifts within the international framework – concerning friends and foes alike – and the rigorous utilisation of these new trends for specific German goals.

- The strategies combined in the New Ostpolitik served both as a glue and as a catalyst for the breakdown of the Grand Coalition between the conservative CDU/CSU and the SPD – depending on the perspectives of the individuals involved and the various problems to which it was applied
The two different aspects of Ostpolitik as a path to unification (i.e. ideological undermining and changing the international framework) were functional not only in the further development of German-American and German-French relations, but also for the support of Brandt’s Ostpolitik in the Cabinet of the Grand Coalition (until opposition to the policy mounted from spring 1968). Thus far, research on the Grand Coalition has failed to cut a clear distinction between the two aspects of the new Ostpolitik and their respective virtues and pitfalls. As a consequence, current interpretations of Kiesinger’s Eastern policy are still very general in character and remain fairly unsatisfactory. Even the ultimate objective of this policy (Germany’s unification) is rarely associated with its creators in the older literature, if at all, and this goal still remains somewhat clouded in the latest publications on the subject.

Additionally, the relentless fight within the conservative parties over the eventual candidate for the next general elections (Barzel, Strauss, Schröder – 1969-1974) has continued to be disregarded as a major factor in the course of Ostpolitik – and has developed into something of a historiographical blind spot.

The conflicts over West Germany's signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty within the Grand Coalition – but most importantly within Chancellor Kiesinger's own Conservative Party – are a telling example of the interconnection of ideology, power politics, focused policy-making and personal ambition. It also serves as an example of the rather limited domestic focus of historical research conducted on the issue thus far. Again, the obstructive impact of party politics and personal intrigue was felt on West German foreign policy during the negotiations with the Soviet Union over a prospective agreement on the mutual renunciation of force. Though these efforts were frustrated by the right-wingers within the Grand Coalition while it lasted, the negotiations and meetings with the Soviets also provided Brandt and particularly Bahr with ample opportunity to test the prospective constraints which a new and rigorous Eastern policy would face in the not-so-distant future. Interpreted from this perspective, the negotiations over the renunciation of force ("Gewaltverzicht"), and the developments in conceptual thinking which they triggered in the inner circle of Bonn's Foreign Office, became something of a parallel, if only speculative foreign policy. It helped to create a perception of what could be achieved if the new Eastern policy were no longer to be a prisoner of the constraints of the Grand Coalition, and particularly of the forces at work within the CDU and CSU.

Thus, three important events stood at the beginnings of a truly new Eastern and German policy in Bonn– and it is no coincidence that contemporaries judged the signature of the NPT by the new Social-Liberal government as the most important of these. It was this signature
which cleared away the apparently insurmountable obstacles to an era of détente: that in the East, where the combination of all those national demands made at Bonn's expense included West Germany's renunciation of nuclear weapons and where the Soviet Union had declared this renunciation to be the most vital precondition of them all; that in the West, where Nixon's and Kissinger's linkage policy had gambled on a central role for the West Germans and for their prospective NPT accession in opening up relations with the East, only to find itself subsequently at a dead end; and the domestic blockade in Bonn, where personal ambition and intrigue for power, marred with a conservative obsession with national status, impaired the analysis, definition and pursuit of truly national interests. The second part of this détente policy triptych was constituted by the experiences of constructive negotiations and shared responsibility involving both superpowers surrounding the Berlin Crisis of the first months of 1969. The third of these events was the ongoing negotiating process over a possible agreement on the renunciation of force between Bonn and Moscow. Without West Germany's accession to the Non Proliferation Treaty, the agreement on the renunciation of force soon codified in the Treaty of Moscow would not have been feasible. And without such an official treaty, progress on all other areas of Bonn's Neue Ostpolitik would have been barred for years.23

- Gomulka, the Head of the Polish Communist Party, saw through the smokescreens provided by Brandt and Bahr, realising the potential threat of "Socialdemocratism" to Communism in Eastern Europe, often neglected or underestimated by other leaders of the Warsaw Pact

Perceptions of the New Ostpolitik varied hugely among the various member states of the Warsaw Pact – dependent upon current political necessities, like Pankow’s thirst for international recognition or the Kremlin’s need for large-scale economic cooperation. Yet only the Polish leadership appears to have realised the ambiguity in Brandt’s Ostpolitik (i.e. the attempt to gain unification through the – temporary – recognition of the status quo) and to have thought this through to its ultimate consequences. 24 Tomala – a leading thinker behind the making of Polish foreign policy at the time – even lists a number of sources in his memoirs25 which seem to prove that Gomulka not only knew about the tactic of "Socialdemocratism" (using a policy of enhanced contacts "to punch holes", "to soften up", and "to undermine" the East) but actively attempted to counteract it. This offers, in turn, an entirely new interpretation of the so-called "Iron Triangle", Gomulka’s device to further economic integration between Poland, the GDR and the Czech Republic. In vain, the
Sovietologists of the 1960s – often ridiculed as Kremlinologists or astrologists – had attempted to decipher Gomulka’s motives. Ulbricht and then Honecker rejected this concept of intensified economic integration outright, because trade with the FRG, effectively as part of the EEC, clearly offered the prospect of more hard currency. This enabled the GDR to obtain advanced Western technology, which in turn constituted the basis of the GDR’s economic preponderance within the Eastern bloc – in Walter Ulbricht’s words, the GDR's "model character". When Gomulka realised the objectives of Brandt’s policy, he estimated that the GDR would merely survive another 10-15 years, accepting at the same time that the work of his life – securing Poland’s Western borders – was in jeopardy. When talking to the Politbureau of Poland's Communist Party in June 1969, he did not even try to hide his fear that the USSR might neglect vital Polish interests for its own sake and that the ever-increasing dependency of the GDR on the West could lead to its complete dissolution: "One can safely assume that the GDR belongs to the EEC-'Six' through its ties with the FRG[...]. In perspective, this might lead not only to economic affiliation, but to rapprochement resulting in [Germany's] unification." He also accused Moscow of pushing for intensified contacts between the Warsaw Pact members and the Brandt administration in Bonn:

"Efforts in favour of an intensification of relations with the FRG come from all sides, particularly from the USSR[...]. We have to draw practical conclusions from this[...] We cannot possibly maintain that we do not care whether or not the FRG recognizes our borders, because our position will be weakened."28

When the Soviet Union and the GDR intensified their contacts with Bonn in early 1970, Gomulka had to act. Isolated by his own allies, he had to salvage whatever he could as quickly as possible (be it the Oder-Neisse Line, or economic arrangements with the West), and did this in cooperation with the new Brandt government. This interpretation would also offer a logical explanation for the sudden end of Warsaw’s complete lack of official communication in response to the secret approaches made by Egon Bahr. What an irony: the only Eastern European ruler who realised the danger coming from "Socialdemocracy", and who actively tried to prevent it, had to become a pathmaker for détente.

- Seen from the eyes of the leadership in the Kremlin, Bonn’s Neue Ostpolitik offered timely leverage for the realisation of Soviet-induced détente policies, welcomed within the Kremlin for both domestic and international reasons. Meanwhile, long-term risks connected with Ostpolitik were grossly underestimated.

Without Brandt's initiative the détente politicians in the Kremlin might never have been in a position to realise their own ideas and concepts. Already in January 1967, Foreign Minister Gromyko confronted the Politbureau with an analysis, demanding the revitalisation of the
dialogue with Washington, which had collapsed after Kennedy's death in 1963. Only good bilateral relations between Moscow and Washington, Gromyko argued, could possibly keep the risks of nuclear war within controllable limits. A precondition to the improvement of these relations was of course Soviet help to end the Vietnam War. Once successfully established, close relations between the superpowers could also serve as a guarantee against any "adventurist ideas" China's leadership might harbour. Only in an era of détente could true Socialism be built and Lenin's demand for a "higher level of productivity" be accomplished. But at that time the initiative of the Kremlin's elder leadership still met with fierce opposition. The Politbureau's younger members in particular wished to continue with a policy of confrontation against the evil of capitalism; Ulbricht succeeded in deviating the "Iron Triangle" between East Berlin, Warsaw and Prague away from economic integration (a goal initially supported by Moscow) and to redefine it as a community of political solidarity against Bonn; and, in Washington, Lyndon B. Johnson became increasingly obsessed with his personal trauma over Vietnam, only to be succeeded by Richard Nixon, who had earned himself a reputation as a "Commie basher" during the McCarthy era. In an almost cynical twist of events, only the crisis in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, reflecting the temporary predominance of the hawks in the Politbureau, with its catastrophic consequences for the Soviet Union's foreign policy stature both within the Warsaw Pact and in relations with the outside world, gave détente-minded politicians in the Kremlin the opportunity to push their policies through. The armed intervention against the Prague Spring had tightened discipline and "solidarity" within the entire Eastern bloc, heightened awareness everywhere of the USSR's dominant position within the Warsaw Pact, opened up the Eastern flank of the second superpower and led both blocs to the verge of a nuclear and conventional arms race, with unpredictable consequences for all parts of the world.

Only in this highly precarious situation in September 1968 were détente and an ongoing dialogue between the superpowers accepted as guiding principles of Soviet foreign policy. In the meantime, suitable partners in the West had almost vanished. In the last months of his administration, Johnson was a "lame duck", not least because of events in the CSSR. Thereafter, Nixon and Kissinger pursued, at least officially, a less compromising course in East-West relations. In Europe, de Gaulle's favourite role as a mediator between the blocs had been discredited by the events of 1968 and he resigned in 1969, priority number one of London's foreign policy was EEC entry and, in Bonn, left- and right-wingers within the Grand Coalition had caused a virtual standstill over foreign policy for the months preceding the general elections. This situation only changed when the Federal German elections in
September 1969 brought Willy Brandt to the Chancellorship in a new coalition, this time comprising his Socialdemocrats and the German Liberals. This virtually gave the Kremlin a unique opportunity that had to be seized. The rapid conclusion of the Moscow Treaty in the summer of 1970 was therefore not only a product of the long-term preparations made on the German side, of the successful probing of each other’s room for manoeuvre, of the skilled tactical game played by Egon Bahr or of Bonn's renewed interest in moving quickly – it was also a sign of the determination with which the mighty few in the Kremlin were able to exploit the chance offered to them. A selective détente struck with Bonn was the only policy which at the time had a prospect of winning over a hesitant majority in the Politbureau of the CPSU to the merits of the new course. Only by leading a selective détente with Bonn could Moscow prove to its allies that it would safeguard their national interests in the pursuit of this new course, and only by pursuing this selective détente with Bonn before the eyes of a global public could Moscow hope to tempt the administration in Washington back to the negotiating table. Once it took off, the détente train picked up such speed that Ulbricht's and Gomulka's objections against fatal exposure to the West were simply overrun. Only after its Western treaties and agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America were successfully finalised, around mid-1973, the Kremlin, too, became somewhat more suspicious and warned its own allies to observe utmost caution over Bonn's potentially subversive tactics in their respective and still-ongoing negotiations. By then, it was too late.

- European integration, and particularly the British application to join the EEC, served London, Paris and Washington as insurance against West German "adventurism", and provided Bonn with a guarantee of a secure "anchoring" in the West ("anchoring" being the term used in Washington, "Westbindung" the term coined in Bonn)

Another crucial aspect – entirely neglected by international historiography until today – is the interrelation between Ostpolitik and the British negotiations for entry to the EEC. Notwithstanding the East-West conflict, the British government had poor intelligence on current thinking in Eastern Europe – indeed, it almost seemed blind-folded after its massive expulsion of Soviet diplomats accused of espionage and the reciprocal expulsion of British diplomats following this. Within the EEC, it had to rely on German mediation. If, however, Brandt’s Ostpolitik was in reality a "Deutschlandpolitik", and if "Deutschlandpolitik" took priority over other policies (as he himself had maintained), then the rift between Britain and the Soviets was an advantageous situation which needed to be exploited or even to be prolonged. This, in turn, would also offer an explanation for the different approaches taken by
Brandt and Kiesinger to de Gaulle's European policies. Bonn as a "good European" was, of course, also a guarantee against any adventurist Ostpolitik – something that was instrumentalised by Bonn as a kind of guarantee ("Ostpolitik starts in the West") and required and even conceptualised by the three Western allies – each in turn with its own national interests and strategy deriving from it. Other facets of this anchoring concept emerged in the West German defense budget (which jumped to an all-time high during the years of Ostpolitik under Social Democratic defense ministers, Helmut Schmidt and Kurt-Georg Leber); in the fact that the financing of the EEC’s push for further, deeper integration was mostly paid by Bonn (this relates particularly to the French demand of a Common Agricultural Policy); and in Brandt's active support for Kissinger's ill-fated idea of a "Year of Europe". The extent of the acceptance of different treatment for West Germany within Europe also shows, prima facie, the extent to which the EEC was actually designed as an instrument of control over the Germans on both sides of the Wall. In open contradiction to the widespread myth that the EEC was a Catholic-conservative device aimed against communism in Europe, there was no discourse whatsoever invoking this perceived role of the Community during its crisis in 1963, when the future of European integration hung for several months on less than a silk thread. There was no such discussion of the – perceived – anti-communist role of the Community by the British, the French, the Germans, the Americans or even the Dutch – not even in internal papers. By contrast, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson told de Gaulle, Nixon, and even Kosygin that the real reason for his desire to bring the United Kingdom into the EEC was to help the French to control the Germans, whose increasing economic success would soon lead to demands for a greater voice in European affairs. None of his interlocutors indicated surprise at this, nor did they contradict him – it was simply accepted.

Partly as a result of a series of spy cases – "solved" under the public gaze – the British remained fairly isolated in the continually-intensifying exchanges between East and West in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Neither the French nor the Americans intended to change this for the sake of their own objectives with regard to détente. It was only in 1975, as a by-product of the CSCE process, that the first British diplomats realised that "exposure to Western values (could have) a long-term impact upon Eastern Europe". Therefore, what Anne Deighton sees as an important contribution of the British to the Ostpolitik of the West, appears in retrospective to have been merely a declaration of insolvency.

- Friction between Washington and Bonn during the Nixon-Brandt-era
Friction between the Nixon and Brandt administrations were manifold and concerned both the personalities involved and the policies they stood for. An important undercurrent to this was the deeply-rooted mistrust in the White House – furthered even under express instruction of the President himself – of the "semi-communist" in Bonn's Chancellor's Office, the Palais Schaumburg. When Brandt and Bahr initiated their negotiating offensive towards Moscow in November 1969, there had been no prior consultations with the White House. The unexpected speed of the negotiations was "breath-taking", even for American standards, and became an additional factor in the growing alienation between Washington and Bonn. Within the few months between the change of government in Bonn and March 1970, visits by Rainer Barzel – then leader of the conservative opposition in Bonn – became a common sight in the White House. Plans and scenarios were developed on how to overthrow the Brandt government and in late March 1970 Barzel already discussed his future cabinet list with Nixon and Kissinger (among other things Barzel enquired if he should – or could – allow Franz Josef Strauß into the cabinet). The President himself noted on the margins of his briefing papers: "Any non socialist government would be better."

In view of this, one question remains: Why was there no early attempt to oust Brandt and his Socialdemocrats from power? Both Bahr and Kissinger were masters of linkage politics (Junktimpolitik in German) and the Americans soon realised that the results of German Ostpolitik presented them with powerful leverage in their own pursuit of a bilateral détente with the other superpower. The still-open ratification of the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw (which Barzel wanted to seize upon for a vote of no confidence in the government) and Bonn's unofficial but vital role in the parallel Four-Power negotiations over a Berlin agreement had become important bargaining tools, and constituted a quintessential trump card in the rapprochement between Washington and Moscow. Barzel returned to Washington in April 1971, warning that Ostpolitik was a possible source of both nationalism and Marxism in Germany and predicting that the CDU would soon turn against Ostpolitik completely, Kissinger simply noted: "This does not fit in our 'game plan' with the Soviet Union at this moment." The change in atmosphere and issues communicated through the top-secret back-channel between Kissinger and Bahr mirrored this historical shift of paradigms in intra-allied tactics. In a conversation with the author, Kissinger conceded that he had serious doubts about the wisdom of Ostpolitik, adding a concise summary of Washington's options at the time:

"We could either lend our open support to the opponents of Ostpolitik within the Federal Republic [in other words: helping to topple the Brandt government], which would have ruined our standing in German politics for a long time to come. Or we could do what we eventually decided, and that was to embrace
Ostpolitik and its proponents in a friendly manner, thus keeping informed and allowing us a chance to steer the whole thing, if necessary."  

For a correct historical understanding of the real friction caused by Ostpolitik in American-German relations, it is therefore of the utmost importance to distinguish between personal emotions, idiosyncratic perceptions, ad-hoc reactions and fundamental national interests. In 1971 and 1972, American and German ideas about détente and Ostpolitik quickly intermingled. With the contemporary unfolding of global détente, the US administration's interest in a successful ratification of the Ostverträge – Bonn's treaties with the East – increased noticeably. At the end of January 1971, it was the White House which returned to Brandt's proposals for speeding up the Berlin negotiations from early December 1970 – viewed at the time with utter disgust in Paris, London and Washington. Kissinger proposed to link up his two existing channels – via Dobrynin to the Kremlin and via Bahr to Brandt – in order to achieve better consultation, coordination and organisation of the Berlin negotiations. In reality, however, Kissinger knew that it was only the Germans who could deliver to the Soviets what they demanded in return for secure access routes to the besieged city. Détente in Europe had become an unofficial prerogative of Moscow, Washington and Bonn, rather than Paris and London, who were still playing the big power games of long-lost days at the official Four-Power talks in Berlin. Brandt, Bahr and Scheel in turn were quick to link a give over Federal presence in West Berlin to the start of negotiations between the West and East German governments and the successful completion of the so-called Grundlagenvertrag, the treaty laying the framework for the relations between Bonn and East Berlin until 1989. At the end of 1972, an astonished Sonnenfeldt praised Bahr as the master of linkage policies to his superior Henry Kissinger:

"It is astonishing in how many areas the East Germans have agreed to open themselves up to dealings with the FRG. Brandt has gone a long way toward achieving the Annäherung which Bahr set out as a policy objective a decade ago. The East German regime, to ensure his success at the polls, has decided to take the risk that this will cause some Wandel in its internal structure too and in its relations with West Germany."  

- Despite apparent inactivity on Bonn's side at the beginning of the CSCE negotiations, Helsinki 1975 was a well- and long-planned climax of the Neue Ostpolitik

The CSCE conference in Helsinki in 1975 provided a natural climax to the Neue Ostpolitik as much as for the historical, worldwide era of détente. As far back as 1967, Bahr had drawn up a strategy – labelled by his team and himself the "timetable" – which was intended finally to result in the multilateralisation of Ostpolitik. The focal point of this process was a comprehensive conference to lay the basis of an all-European security system. This, it was thought at the time, should aim at reducing tensions along the Iron Curtain, opening the way
for the "growing together" of the two German states, ideally leading in the distant future to some kind of confederation and perhaps unification. Outside Bonn – in East and West alike – Helsinki was primarily perceived in the words of John Maresca, head of the American delegation, as an "Ersatz-Peace" over Germany.48

Apart from those famous images of Schmidt and Honecker sitting side-by-side on the conference benches, the Federal Republic played little if any role in the proceedings and results. Instead, it could be argued that West German Ostpolitik had been so successfully implemented over the preceding years that by 1975 it had already become a widely-accepted basis of détente policies in Europe (at least in the Western hemisphere). This, in turn, allowed the German “Ostpoliticians”, by now widely regarded as renowned and almost elder statesmen, to ease their own efforts and leave the field to the French and other interested parties. This of course helped to redress the rather-strained balance in Franco-German relations while still leading up to exactly the kind of result in Helsinki for which West German policy had long aspired: basket III.49 Back in 1969, only days before the general elections, Bahr had written a conclusion to the thoughts developed in his team, which he then considered as something of a legacy for whichever party would seize power in Bonn thereafter. This paper gave clear evidence of the interconnection between the conference and the long-term strategy embedded in Brandt's Neue Ostpolitik:

"European Security Conference

The Warsaw Pact states have tabled their proposal; we now have to try to instrumentalise it for the pursuit of our own interests. The conference offers an opportunity to table proposals aiming at a security system in Europe and at building the defense-political preconditions for a peaceful order[...]. We could also use our readiness to participate at an ESC as a leverage to obtain the inner-German treaty[...]. In all this we should solely be guided by the prospect of an irreversible political process, and we should only retreat from positions which do not offer any better political advantages."50

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1 The research project "Ostpolitik und Détente" at the University of Mannheim is funded by the Thyssen-Foundation and headed by Gottfried Niedhart. Further information, including recent publications stemming from the project, can be found at www.detente.de or www.ostpolitik.net.

2 There still exists some controversy about the labelling of this policy. "Bridge building" and "Wandel durch Annäherung" were clearly euphemisms. Johnson later referred to "ideological competition", Bahr referred to it as "Sozialdemokratismus". While Bahr's term is open to criticism due to it originating from Communist sources (depicting their fight against the bourgeois labour movement particularly in Germany), Francis Bator disapproved of the term "competition" or even "liberalization" as implying a "zero-sum-strategy". Both Brandt's Ostpolitik and Johnson's détente were not based on static policy models but aimed at inducing social, economic and political change. One of the best descriptions of this reasoning can be found in an article by Francis Bator, The Politics of Alliance – the United States and Western Europe, in Kermit Gordon (ed.), Agenda for the Nation, Brookings 1971, pp. 335-372.

3 Conversation Khrushchev-Kennedy, Vienna, 4.6.1961; Russian Original and (East) German translation. SAPMO: Büro Ulbricht, DY30/3663. It appears that different perceptions of this talk existed in Moscow and Washington. While the Soviet protocol gives the impression that Khrushchev intended to confront the young US President with the dangers and his responsibilities for avoiding a nuclear catastrophe, the American Memcon concentrates on Khrushchev's threat. LBJL: NSF, Rostow File, vol. 11.


Other works on French foreign policy in this era often neglect this aspect: Reiner Marcowitz, Option für Paris? Unionsparteien, SPD und Charles de Gaulle, Munich 1996, rejects outright any "speculation" about the goals of de Gaulle’s German policy. Andreas Wilkens is similarly descriptive in his treatment of the Pompidou era, Der unstete Nachbar – Frankreich, die deutsche Ostpolitik und die Berliner Vier-Mächte-Verhandlungen 1969-1974, Munich 1990. See also the same, Ostpolitik allemande et commerce avec l’Est-

The author had the privilege to consult, on the permission of Amiral de Gaulle, the records of President de Gaulle's written and oral communications with German politicians between 1958 and 1969. Contents and style of the conversation with Brandt in June 1965 is indeed unique.

Conversation de Gaulle-Brandt, 2.6.1965, 17-18.10 o'clock, at the Elysée. AN: 5 AG 1/167.


For the true background of Johnson's October 1966 speech, see also Francis M. Bator, Lyndon Johnson and Foreign Policy – the Case of Western Europe and the Soviet Union, in: Aaron Lobel (ed.), Presidential Judgement – Foreign Policy Decision Making in the White House, Harvard 2001, pp. 41-77. Bator authored the original draft and also served as a coordinator for eventual changes until the final version emerged. Conversation between Francis Bator and the author, 27.3.2004.


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Conversation de Gaulle-Brandt, 2.6.1965, 17-18.10 o'clock, at the Elysée. AN: 5 AG 1/167.

20 The importance of the conflict between Kiesinger and Strauß for the realisation of Ostpolitik is completely ignored by Clay Clemens, Reluctant Realists: the CDU/CSU and West German Ostpolitik 1969-1982, Duke University 1989; and Andrea H. Schneider, Die Kunst des Kompromisses – Helmut Schmidt und die große Koalition 1966-1969, Paderborn 1999. Schneider at least mentions the impact of this personal struggle, though without describing the conflict in any detail. Dirk Kroegel, Einen Anfang finden! – Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition, Munich 1997, analyses the fight of the epigones within the Union in its interrelation to Ostpolitik, but fails to distinguish between the strategic approaches involved. In the end – despite its programmatic title – Kroegel's book does not offer a coherent explanation of Kiesinger’s goals and strategies towards the East – unless Kiesinger himself was a dedicated follower of the panta-rhei-theory.

21 Leaving contemporary conservative critics to one side, even academics sympathetic to Brandt have found it difficult to believe in the continuation of the primacy of German unification – as demanded by the Federal German constitution. For Karl Kaiser, one of the most sensitive analysts then affiliated with the Royal Institute of International Affairs (originally set up to monitor German affairs), the ultimate goal was at the very best a strategy of biding time, because unification seemed no longer to be a priority of the new Ostpolitik. Karl Kaiser, German Foreign Policy in Transition – Bonn Between East and West, Oxford (RHA) 1968. For a fairly similar line, see Ernst Kuper, Frieden durch Konfrontation und Kooperation – Die Einstellung von Gerhard Schröder und Willi [sic] Brandt zur Entspannungspolitik, Stuttgart 1974. And even Peter Bender kept himself remarkably covered on this aspect in his standard work: Neue Ostpolitik – Vom Mauerbau bis zum Moskauer Vertrag, Munich 1986 (this applies still to the fourth edition of 1996). Even in Heinrich Pothoff's work from 1999, Im Schatten der Mauer – Deutschlandpolitik 1961 bis 1990, Berlin 1999, neither the strategy of undermining Communism (through the so-called Socialdemocratism) nor the perceived European security system are seen to play a role. Instead, despite his exclusive access to the Wehner papers – or perhaps because of it – Pothoff declares Wehner's much more limited concept of an orderly co-existence („geregelten Miteinanders“) as the leitmotif of Bonn's Eastern policy between 1966 and 1973.


24 The first time this conclusion was presented in German or even Western literature was in 1982, in a highly detailed analysis of Polish publications by Dieter Bingen. See Dieter Bingen, Die Bonner Deutschlandpolitik 1969-1979 in der polnischen Publizistik, Frankfurt/M 1982; ibid., Die Polenpolitik der Bonner Republik von Adenauer bis Kohl 1949-1991, Baden-Baden 1998.

25 Mięczysław Tomala, Deutschland - von Polen gesehen, Zu den deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen 1945-1990, Marburg 2000. Tomala was not only a professor at the Polish Institute for International Affairs, but also worked as a consultant and interpreter both for Gomulka himself and the Polish Foreign Ministry. A number of private and official documents are reprinted in his book in full.

Conversation Gomulka-Brezhnev, Moscow, 3.3.1969. AAN: KC PZPR, teczka 1742, S. 402ff. [translated following Tomala, Deutschland, p. 275ff] It is interesting to notice that Gomulka's reasoning and wording were almost identical with the explanations for the Polish change of course given by Lewandowski, departmental head in the Polish Foreign Office, to Australian ambassador Blakeley, with the explicit intention that this be repeated to the West Germans. FS 1708, Moscow, Allardt, 13.11.1969. PAAA: Ref. IIA1, VS-Bd. 4377.

Some examples of the change between October 1970 and May 1973: On 16.10.1970, Brezhnev "asked" Comrade Ulbricht for the elimination from his draft speech to the VIIIth SED Party Conference of a passage directed against Brandt's Ostpolitik ("at face value, according to its own declarations, Brandt's administration is trying to obtain access to the socialist countries for imperialism through the backdoor"). Shortly after this, Gromyko spelt out Moscow policy line in a conversation with Ulbricht on 29.10.1970: "You are informed about the recent line taken by the Brandt government. This line will be supported." Three years later, on 11.5.1973, Moscow's allies in the Warsaw Pact were informed about the underlying reasons for Brezhnev's visit to Bonn – and the reasons differed markedly from those given in 1970: "This will serve to lay open the reform agenda and anti-communism pursued by the SPD and international Socialdemocracy." Honecker – who had actually been the author of the disputed sentence in October 1970 and who had been an ongoing critic warning Moscow against Bonn's Ostpolitik – found this sentence so important that he marked it in thick pen. SAPMO: Bureau Ulbricht in the SED-Politbureau, DY 30/3530 und -/3654.


The Journal of European Integration History, the most likely forum for any such analysis, featured very few articles on the interrelation between European integration and Eastern policy in the past, none of which referred to a connection between Britain's entry bid and West German Ostpolitik; among them – despite its promising title - Andreas Wilkens, Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of Economic and Monetary Union – Germany’s European Policy in the Brandt Era (1969-1974), in: Journal of European Integration History, Baden-Baden 1995, pp. 73-102; and Beatrice Heuser, The European Dream of Franz Josef Strauss, in: Journal of European Integration History, Baden-Baden 1997/1998, pp. 75-103. Heuser offers no sources whatsoever on her topic, avoiding any discussion of Ostpolitik.


37 For the decision to act against the Soviet embassy employees taken under Wilson in September and October 1968, see PRO: PREM 13/2009.

38 Anne Deighton, Ostpolitik or Westpolitik? – British foreign policy, 1968-75, in: International Affairs, vol. 74,4 (1998), pp. 893-901. Because Deighton works exclusively from the documents in the DOBPO volumes, the realities of the West's Eastern policy remain somewhat blurred. The self-congratulating, almost euphemistic style of writing of FCO officials is taken for granted without much criticism – a classic pitfall of mono-archival research on international relations.

Brian White, Britain, Détente and Changing East-West Relations, London 1992, at least identifies a “gradual failure to adopt to a changing pattern of East-West relations in the 1960s” – despite an ostentatious lack of sources (amid claims to the contrary).


39 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, Boston 1979, p. 411; Egon Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, München 1996, p. 271. The messages exchanged between Bahr and Kissinger through their secretive back channel over the years were collected by Bahr. AdsD, Bahr Papers, vol. 439.

40 For the multiplicity of CDU visits and visitors to the White House, particularly in the early months of 1970, see NARA: Nixon, NSC, CF, 683-684; NARA: Nixon, White House Staff File, Conference File, box 6; NARA: DoS, CF, POL 7 GER W.

41 Memorandum from Kissinger for Nixon, briefing the President for his talks with German Foreign Minister Scheel on the same day, 18.7.1970. NARA,:Nixon, NSC, CF 683.


43 Bahr informed Brandt on 28.3.1972, after his latest encounter with Kissinger, that “it was the first time that the talks took place in a warm [herzliche] atmosphere.” AdsD: Bahr Papers, vol. 439/2.

44 Kissinger's conversation with the author, New York, 23.7.2003.

45 A table of contents summarising Kissinger's channel to Dobrynin simply notes for 31.1.1971: „Berlin and European Security - Procedure worked out for HAK-Dobrynin Channel to be linked up with Bahr and Rush channels.” NARA, Nixon, NSC, HAK 57.

46 Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 7.11.1972. NARA, Nixon, NSC, CF 687.

47 After Bahr succeeded Diehl as the head of the planning staff in the German Foreign Office in December 1967, work on concepts for a prospective European security system intensified. First, elaborate plans were presented to Brandt in April 1968, already involving the idea of seizing upon the Warsaw Pact proposal of a European security conference. The various papers and numerous drafts can be found in AdsD: Bahr Papers, vol. 316.

